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In Ganske v. Mensch, a defamation suit stemming from a “battle by Tweet,” a federal district court in New York held that the allegedly defamatory statements in the defendant’s Tweet were nonactionable statements of opinion and dismissed the case. The case illustrates that courts in such “Twibel” (Twitter + libel) cases may view Tweets and similar statements on social media as informal and “freewheeling” in nature, which reasonable readers would understand to be expressions of opinion rather than statements of fact.

Charles Ganske, a former Associated Press (AP) journalist, sued Louise Mensch, a blogger and former member of the British Parliament, for defamation and tortious interference. Ganske argued that Mensch defamed him and interfered with his employment at AP based on a single Tweet that she posted on July 27, 2018, by which she “interjected herself” into a Twitter thread between Ganske and another Twitter user with the handle @Conspirator0.

Mensch’s Tweet from her @patribotics Twitter account stated: “To this xenophobic tweet of yours, sir, I fear we must tell @APCentral ‘citation needed’. You clearly personally spread Russian bots on your own site; and @Conspirator0 work on it has sent you into a frenzy of tweeting and trying to discredit him.”

Ganske claimed that Mensch’s Tweet contained false and defamatory statements about him because neither he nor his Tweets were xenophonic and he never spread Russian bots on any website. He also alleged that Mensch deliberately tagged his employer, AP, and published the Tweet to @APCentral in order to interfere with his employment. Ganske’s employment with AP was later terminated, and Ganske argued that this was the result of Mensch’s Tweet.
Continue Reading S.D.N.Y. Dismisses Defamation Case Arising Out of “Battle by Tweet”

As we have noted many times in prior articles, courts often refuse to enforce “browsewrap” agreements where terms are presented to users merely by including a link on a page or screen without requiring affirmative acceptance. Courts typically look more favorably on “clickwrap” agreements where users agree to be bound by, for example, checking a box or clicking an “I accept” button.

The problem is that many implementations of online contracts do not fit neatly into one category or the other. The result is that courts, seemingly unable to resist the siren song of the “-wrap” terminology, find themselves struggling to shoehorn real-life cases into the binary clickwrap/browsewrap rubric, and often resort to inventing new terminology such as the dreaded “hybridwrap.”

HealthplanCRM, LLC v. Avmed, Inc., a case out of the Western District of Pennsylvania, illustrates this phenomenon. Plaintiff Cavulus licensed certain CRM software to defendant AvMed. AvMed decided to replace Cavulus software with a different CRM product and engaged defendant NTT to assist AvMed in transitioning its data to the successor product. Cavulus alleged, among other things, that NTT misappropriated its trade secrets in the course of doing this work. Cavulus sought to compel NTT to arbitrate these claims based on an arbitration clause contained in an “End-User Agreement” that was referenced in a link on the log-in page of the Cavulus software.
Continue Reading Court Discovers Rare and Elusive “Enforceable Browsewrap”